

## Colegio Americano de Torreón Model United Nations (CATMUN)

### **Security Council**

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#### **Committee Background:**

The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. The five permanent members are: China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Apart from these five members, there are another ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly, which are: Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, and South Africa. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions.

The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## **A. Fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the South China Sea**

### History

Maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships are one of the contemporary challenges of the maritime industry. These two phenomena have a global impact on maritime trade and security. Nowadays, the Gulf of Aden and the South China Sea are considered high risk areas in terms of piracy and armed robbery against ships activities. In this regard, both the international community and the coastal States of the region have deployed every effort to try to find ways to address the problem. Maritime piracy is considered a transnational crime because a ship is considered the sovereign territory of the nation whose flag it flies. The term “piracy” encompasses two distinct sorts of offences: the first is robbery or hijacking, where the target of the attack is to steal a maritime vessel or its cargo; the second is kidnapping, where the vessel and crew are threatened until a ransom is paid.

### Current Situation

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the South China Sea is not only a contraband problem but it is a brutal, uncontrollable, acquisitive crime. These areas have experienced the largest rate of global piracy attacks in the past years, and the problem appears to be growing since 2008. As for this, most goods and trade ships transit both of these dangerous waterways, running the risk to be victims of a pirate attack. Somalia is not the only area of the world affected by maritime piracy. In fact, the waters of the South China Sea are also a victim of this phenomenon. Each year, more than 120,000 ships cross South China’s waterways, accounting for a third of the world’s marine commerce. In recent months, well-armed and organized pirate groups have focused their efforts on the oil tankers that exit the narrow Malacca and Singapore straits and venture into the South China Sea. Here, the territory is vast, law enforcement’s resources are stretched, and the potential profits are immense.

Moreover, the reduction in piracy attacks during 2000-2004 was attributed to effective and coordinated international action against the pirates, but since 2008- 2009 they have increased, and once again piracy has caught the international community’s attention. As for this, maritime trade is threatened and ransom payments to Somali and Chinese pirates have risen to the millions of dollars. The amount of ransom demanded by the pirate groups over the past few years has risen from tens of thousands of dollars to hundreds of thousands and even millions. According to the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the state of piracy in Somalia (2009), the “Eyl Group” alone was holding hostage six vessels and their crew and was expected to have earned approximately \$30 million in ransom payments.

Drifting further from the Somali coasts into the Gulf of Aden, the pirates are attacking commercial freighters and other vessels that have nothing to do with Somalia. Instead of defending the cause of the Somali people, pirates today attack vessels bearing the food aid on which so many Somalis depend. On the other hand, in the South China Sea, pirates are attacking between 70% and 80% of all the cargo ships that import oil from China and Japan.

For this reason, the individuals involved in these attacks must have oil-industry experience and contacts through which to sell the stolen oil.

Consequently, canal authorities have reported declines in shipping traffic and resulting revenue loss recently, due both to decreased economic activity and the piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden. Pirates do not limit their attacks to one kind of ship, although bulk carriers, container ships and general cargo ships comprise the majority of piracy targets.

### Conclusion

The UNESCO has proposed a successful long-term strategy to eliminate piracy will require a two-pronged approach: an international naval force must protect maritime shipping and interdict pirates, while diplomatic, security, and economic efforts to eliminate the root causes of piracy proceed within Somalia and China.

Because of that, Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke has argued that, “[Y]ou cannot tackle piracy from the sea no matter how many naval ships you put into the waters... the best way to actually fight the piracy is to tackle these things from the land.” Since piracy is only possible with mainland support and information, UNESCO proposes to address piracy from land by implementing measures to prevent the outflow of this money or the inflow of products (particularly arms, maritime craft and parts, and vehicles) could also reduce incentives for piracy.

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## **B. Proxy War in Eastern Ukraine**

### History

Since April 2014, Russia has been waging a proxy war in eastern Ukraine, through its increasingly escalating support of pro-Russian separatists in the ersatz Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. Although Moscow has repeatedly denied supporting the pro-Russian separatists, it is clear that these rebel militias are not some rag-tag grassroots self-defence organizations, simply protecting the Russian speaking population in eastern Ukraine, but are actually well trained, well equipped, and seasoned fighters. In regards to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Russian media repeatedly spreads blatant lies – that the Ukrainian government and military forces loyal to Kyiv are American-backed fascists, for example, or are committing near “genocide” against the Russian speakers of eastern Ukraine. Indeed, it is evident that such propaganda has had the effect that Moscow desired. Such messages are more readily accepted by large numbers of the pro-Russian population in eastern Ukraine, which already held political-cultural worldviews that tended to be more anti-Western, pro-Russian, and nostalgic towards the former Soviet Union

### Current Situation

The current conflict in the East of Ukraine could be characterized as a proxy war. “Proxy warfare” is the most precise term to describe the current Russian-Ukrainian turbulent reality. A proxy war is when both or one of the participants represent the interests of other larger powers, and may have help and support from these powers. The Russian proxy groups in Eastern Ukraine are used by Russians as a key driving force to meet this goal through the facilitation of political, informational, cyber, etc. operations in the field. It is a proxy war with the hybrid tactics.

Every war is an informational war. The idiosyncrasies of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are in a targeted usage of an information operations’ block as one of the key buttons of the current mega-war. It is a big and perpetually red button, though not the only one. An information component presents an important population-focused approach to the Russian variety of mega-operations in the region. Information warfare is “any action to deny, exploit corrupt or destroy the enemy’s information and its functions”.

Again, it is an action taken “in support of the national security strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage by attacking an adversary’s information infrastructure through exploitation, denial and influence while protecting friendly information systems”. The tactical tasks and operational plans of a Russian information campaign have two goals. The first is to draw Ukraine into an information “weapons” race. Russia as a country with still solid economic potential tries to engage Ukraine in a counter-information capacity building competition. It takes money, time, expertise and diverts attention of Ukrainians from the other important internal issues. The second goal is to create a strong and irreversible set of semantic influences on the psyche of the people in the occupied regions to acquire their new identity and consequently change their social behaviour. The first phase of this process is

deprivation – a mental state where a person is unable to satisfy some of his/her basic mental needs for a long time.

### Conclusion

The tragic circumstances of the Russian-Ukrainian war deeply affect people and drastically reduce their economic opportunities, traditional social perspectives and overwhelms their life plans. The deprivation creates a “negative pressure” on a person’s cognition, causing discomfort and gradual neuroticism. A “negative” information pressure leads to the search and absorption of “other” information that, according to its means of delivery, is familiar and similar to people. A rational component of choice is minimized since under the conditions of deprivation there is often no alternative to the circumstances people live in. Only some limited groups of Ukrainians are able to reject the “other” destructive information.

The current Russian info-operations are about to try to change people’s behavioural codes gradually. Ukrainians are persuaded to participate in a surrounding communicative process, even if such a process is passive and with a certain sense of distrust. It reminds a purchase of a low-quality, but “eatable” food. People know that their current economic situation makes them to buy a low-quality product, though they comfort themselves with the thought that the next time they will be able to buy something better. However, the “next time” never happens. Because others behave in the same way and suffer from similar financial and social discomfort, there is no obvious sense for them to risk for the sake of an “imaginary personal comfort”.

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